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ABSTRACT
The goal of this study was to empirically examine the propensity to create 
budgetary slack. The research was designed to test the hypothesized moderating effect 
of broadscope managerial accounting system use on variables that are associated with 
the propensity to create budgetary slack, and it is the first known attempt to do so.
The study also extends the previous research that has been conducted on budgetary 
slack.
After an extensive literature review was conducted on the variables studied, 
questionnaires were sent to 2,000 managers in the United States. The response rate 
was lower than expected at 105, but high enough to perform the needed methodology 
for this study.
The research found broadscope managerial accounting systems use 
significantly correlated to budget participation, budget emphasis and perceived 
environmental uncertainty. No support was found for broadscope managerial 
accounting system use as a moderator of the relationship between the propensity to 
create budgetary slack and budgetary participation, the propensity to create budgetary 
slack and budget emphasis, and the propensity to create budgetary slack and perceived 
environmental uncertainty.
111
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The results of the study provide several managerial implications for budgetary 
slack and broadscope managerial accounting systems. The findings of the study add to 
the growing body of empirical evidence regarding budgetary slack and the role 
information has in budgeting.
iv
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
To date, several empirical studies have appeared in the accounting literature 
exploring the relationships among budgetary slack, budget participation, budgetary 
emphasis, and environmental uncertainty. However, none of these studies have 
examined the moderating affect the use o f broadscope managerial accounting systems 
on these variables' influences on budgetary slack. Identification of the moderating 
effects of the use o f broadscope managerial accounting systems on the effects of 
budget emphasis, participation, and perceived uncertainty on slack is the major 
contribution of this study.
Broadscope Managerial Accounting Systems
Information for business decisions can be obtained from a firm's accounting 
information system (Bruns, 1968). Substantial non-financial data as well as the 
traditional financial data should be provided to managers. Managers should be able to 
obtain information pertaining to marketing, finance, and production. Forecasts, trend 
data, and demand estimates should be provided to managers. Indepth information on 
the activities of competitors should also be provided to management (Gordon and
1
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2
Miller, 1976). Managers in complex and uncertain environments should use more 
information to help control the uncertainties (Galbraith, 1973).
Hays (1977) found that traditional managerial accounting systems did not 
provide enough information for decision making or evaluation. To obtain the needed 
information, a new information system would need to be created. Hayes found this 
additional non-financial data to be significant in aiding decision making by managers. 
As a result, managerial accounting systems have evolved to include traditionally non- 
financial data focusing on functional areas and predictive information to enable 
managers to make more informed decisions (Mia and Chenhall, 1994). The 
information systems designed to provide this additional data are referred to as 
broadscope managerial accounting systems.
Budgetary Slack
Practically all major companies use budgets for planning and controlling. 
Budgets can be a significant tool of management for mapping the future of a business, 
and the existence of errors in a budget causes corporate profits to be lower than 
possible (Onsi, 1973). There are two main reasons a budget would not be accurate.
One is by error, the other is by design. This study is concerned with budgetary slack, 
which is one of the causes o f budgetary inaccuracy due to design.
There are two different types of slack that can effect an organization. Cyert 
and March (1964) defined organizational slack as the difference between the resources 
available to the firm and the resources necessary to maintain the organization. Onsi
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
(1973) named the other type budgetary slack. Budgetary slack represents either the 
amount of additional resources managers purposely construct in the budget or the 
amount by which they wittingly understate productive capability (Young, 1985). In 
this paper we are concerned with the latter type of slack. In a nonempirical study 
Schiff and Lewin (1970) concluded that, through a process of understating revenues 
and overstating costs, managers will create budgets with slack. The amount of slack 
varies over time and between companies but Schiff and Lewin (1970) concluded that 
slack may account for as much as 20-25% of a division's budgeted operating expenses
Budgetary slack is generally thought of as detrimental to organizations, but it 
also can be beneficial in certain instances. Schiff and Lewin (1968) found that 
"management can and does create slack to achieve attainable budgets and to secure 
resources for furthering their personal goals and desires.” Schiff and Lewin believed 
that slack creation was universal with managers in companies that were profitable or 
nonprofitable, stable or growing. They concluded that it served management's best 
interest to have slack in the budget.
Budgetary Participation
Hanson (1966) and Dunbar (1971) contend that participation in the budget 
process influences the motivation (effort) o f managers to meet the budget. Also, 
participation provides subordinates with an opportunity to build budgetary slack into 
their standards o f performance (Schiff and Lewin, 1970; Young, 1985). Managers
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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who participate in the budget process may manipulate the budgeting process to obtain 
easier operating budgets (Dunk, 1990).
Budget Emphasis
0
As the pressure from supervisors to attain the budgeted goals increases, the 
likelihood that managers create budget slack will also increase (Merchant, 1985). This 
pressure applied from supervisors is budget emphasis (Hogstede, 1968). When the 
attainment of budgeted goals is emphasized, it is normal for slack to be present in 
budgets (Lowe and Shaw, 1968).
Hopwood (1972) found different styles of management caused differing 
amounts of budget slack. The styles the managers used differed as to how much 
emphasis was placed on obtaining budgeted goals. Otley (1978) found a significant 
positive relationship between supervisory style (the amount o f emphasis placed on the 
budget) and budgetary performance.
Perceived Environmental Uncertainty
A major reason managers create budgetary slack is uncertainty. The 
uncertainty of an event is the number o f different outcomes the event can have 
(Gardner, 1962). It is the perception of this uncertainty rather than the actual 
uncertainty that affects the decision making (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967).
Duncan (1972) found that individuals making decisions in complex 
environments experience more uncertainty than those decision makers in less complex 
environments. The environment is determined by objective reality (Galbraith, 1973).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Statement of the Problem
There have been numerous accounting studies that have examined what causes 
managers to build budgetary slack. Few of the studies have provided ways to reduce 
the amount of slack that managers create. This study will extend the previous research 
that has been conducted on budgetary slack with the goal of providing a possible 
method of reducing the amount of budgetary slack that managers create in both the 
expense side and revenue side of operating budgets.
Objectives of the Study
The objective of this study is to empirically examine the moderating effect of 
broadscope managerial accounting systems on the relationships among budget 
participation, budget emphasis, perceived environmental uncertainty, and the 
propensity to create budgetary slack. Broadscope managerial accounting system 
information is expected to moderate the influence of budget participation, budget 
emphasis, and perceived environmental uncertainty on budget slack.
Contributions of the Study
Identification of the moderating role of the use of broadscope managerial 
accounting systems on the effects of budget emphasis, participation, and perceived 
uncertainty is the major contribution of this study. The results of this study will 
contribute to a better understanding o f budgetary slack and the use of bioadscope 
accounting information systems. In addition, the findings can be used to aid 
management in reducing the amount of budgetary slack in company budgets, and help
I
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determine the usefulness of additional nonfinancial information that could be provided 
to managers with budgetary responsibilities. Consequently, both revenue and expense 
budgets will be more accurate, and thus more useful to management. More accurate 
budgets will improve planning and therefore, the productivity o f such companies.
This study extends the research of Nouri (1994) and Mia and Chenhall (1994) and 
directly makes suggestions for future research extending the work of Mia and 
Chenhall (1994).
Organization of This Dissertation
The relationships among broadscope managerial accounting systems, 
budgetary slack, budget emphasis, budgetary participation, and perceived uncertainty 
will be studied. Literature related to the variables in the study is described in Chapter 
2 (Literature Review). Chapter 3 (Research Methodology) outlines the research 
methodology and presents the hypotheses and their rationale, the data collection 
procedure, the statistical techniques used, and the research instrument. The results of 
the data analysis will be presented in Chapter 4 (Presentation and Analysis o f Data). 
Finally, Chapter 5 (Discussion and Implications) will present the conclusions of the 
study, the limitations, the implications for managers, and directions for future 
research.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter is a summary of reviews of the relevant literature. The first 
section is a summary of the literature relevant to the variables of interest in this study: 
broadscope managerial accounting systems, budgetary slack, budget participation, 
budget emphasis, and perceived environmental uncertainty. The second section is a 
discussion of literature addressing interrelationships among those variables.
Previous Research on Variables of Interest
Broadscope Managerial Accounting 
Systems
Bums (1968), in a nonempirical study, hypothesized:
if accounting information is perceived as irrelevant for the set of decisions to 
be made, accounting information will not affect decisions: if accounting 
information is perceived as relevant to the set of decisions to be made, it may 
affect decisions.
Bums made the assumptions that "an individual conceives accounting information as 
either a goal or at a point on a continuum on which accounting varies from a perfect 
measure to an imperfect one." Following this assumption Bums hypothesized: "the 
conceptions of accounting held by a decision-maker will affect his selection of a
7
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decision rule to be used in reaching a set of decisions." He broke the hypothesis down 
further:
1) If accounting information is both a decision input and an objective (goal) 
sought by a decision-maker, accounting information will affect decisions.
2) The more a decision-maker conceives accounting as being a perfect source 
of information, the more likely the decision-maker will select decision 
rules that weight accounting heavily, and the more likely accounting 
information will affect decisions.
Bums believed that "the effects of non-accounting information on decisions 
can be analyzed in the same framework as accounting information." He believed that 
the relevance of accounting information would increase as the relevance of non­
accounting information increased. Thus he expressed his final hypothesis as: "the 
impact o f accounting information on decisions is affected by the perceived relevance 
of other information also available to the decision-maker." A firm's accounting 
information system can furnish information for business decisions (Bums, 1968). One 
of management’s main problems consists of determining how to use information to 
establish proper budget goals (Schiff and Lewin, 1970).
Gordon and Miller (1976) proposed a broad framework for information 
systems to meet the needs for decision makers. They believed that information 
systems should include a variety of information. According to them, an information 
system should provide managers with substantial non-financial data, as well as the 
traditional financial data. Managers should have access to marketing, financ e  and 
production information, as well as to forecasts, trend data, and demand estimates.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Additionally, the system should furnish indepth information on the activities of 
competitors.
Hayes (1977) surveyed marketing, production, research and development 
managers, and controllers in 103 firms in Ohio. He found that traditional managerial 
accounting systems did not provide enough information for decision making or 
evaluation. This identified the need for new information systems.
Several studies (Hayes, 1977; Larker, 1981; Gordon and Narayanan, 1984) 
have shown that this additional non-financial data, referred to as broadscope 
information, has significantly aided managers in decision making. However, the 
information did not prove equally useful for all decisions (Gordon et al., 1978). 
Regardless of the information's usefulness, managers sought more of it when their 
perceived environmental uncertainty increased (Gordon and Narayanan, 1984).
Chenhall and Morris (1986) gathered information from 68 managers in 36 
different manufacturing organizations in Australia. They based theii interviews on 
structured questionnaires. Their study showed that broadscope information helped 
both decentralized and centralized managers in their decision making. Chenhall and 
Morris stated that such information included—among other factors-economic data 
such as G.N.P., total market sales, and company's share of that market. It also 
included noneconomic data such as demographic factors, consumer tastes, 
competitors' actions, and technological advances.
Managerial accounting systems have evolved to include traditionally non- 
financial data focusing on functional areas and predictive information to enable
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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managers to make more informed decisions (Mia and Chenhall, 1994). Mia and 
Chenhall selected 29 marketing and 46 production managers from five firms using 
broadscope managerial accounting systems and employing at least 1,000 workers 
each. To qualify as broadscope information systems, the managerial accounting 
systems had to provide the following three types of information:
1) non-financial data as well as financial information (e.g., indicators of 
scrap, machine downtime, production costs, delivery times in days, and 
improved sales dollars from improvements in delivery);
2) future information presented in probabilistic forms (least likely, most 
likely, most optimistic) as well as historic data (e.g., projected product 
prices and costs of production, historic and current prices, and costs and 
trend data);
3) information on external factors, as well as internal data (e.g., competitors' 
market share and the company's budget for marketing promotions).
To measure the use of broadscope managerial accounting system, Mia and
Chenhall (1994) used an instrument they had developed earlier (1986). They
concluded that
if managers use broadscope information supplied by a managerial accounting 
system, then given comparable decision-making skills, their application of the 
information should provide a relative advantage in performing their managerial 
tasks and assist in improving their performance.
Budgetary Slack
Budgetary slack represents either the amount of additional resources managers 
purposely construct in the budget or the amount by which they wittingly understate 
productive capability (Young, 1985). Budgetary slack and "forecast accuracy" differ. 
Onsi (1973) stated the difference between the two as follows:
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Forecast error, to a large extent, is unintentional and can be reduced by using 
better estimation techniques. Budgetary slack, however, is intentional. 
Budgetary deviations between actual and standards, then, are due to different 
sources: intentional slack build-up in the standards, unintentional estimation 
errors, and changes in the level of efficiency from that planned.
Slack can be useful for projects not specifically approved in the budget. Budgetary
slack generally works to an organization's detriment, but managers can use it
beneficially in certain instances (Onsi, 1973).
Onsi (1973) conducted the first empirical examination of budgetary slack. He
interviewed 32 managers of five large companies. Controllers, budget directors,
production vice-presidents, sales vice-presidents, and divisional managers were
interviewed. Onsi found that 80% of the managers bargained for slack in the budgets
they created. Onsi believed no operating budget had zero slack in any year. He found
slack in managed and manufactured costs, as well as in sales volume and sales price.
Managers gave two reasons why they created slack: pressure from superiors to attain
budget amounts and show yearly growth, and protection against uncertainty. The
managers believed if  they could establish slack they could use it when needed to
improve profitability.
From the information gleaned from the interviews, Onsi constructed a
questionnaire with 44 relevant variables. The questionnaire was sent to 132 managers
from seven large corporations, all with divisions in upstate New York. Completed and
returned questionnaires numbered 107 or 81%. Onsi concluded that budgetary slack
resulted from pressure and emphasis on budget attainment as a source of performance
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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evaluation. The managers' superiors' ability to detect the slack had no bearing on the 
slack created.
Schiff and Lewin (1968) interviewed officers—presidents; controllers; and vice 
presidents of planning, marketing and production-and their staffs from three 
independent divisions of Fortune's 100 largest corporations. They found that 
"management can and does create slack to achieve attainable budgets and to secure 
resources for furthering their personal goals and desires." Schiff and Lewin believed 
that managers—whether from profitable or nonprofitable companies or from stable or 
growing firms—created slack. They (Schiff and Lewin, 1968) concluded that it 
"clearly serves management's interests to have slack in the budget."
In a later nonempirical study, Schiff and Lewin (1970) stated that "managers 
will create slack in budgets through a process of understating revenues and overstating 
costs." The amount o f slack varied over time and between companies, but Schiff and 
Lewin (1970) concluded that slack may have accounted for as much as 20-25% of a 
division's budgeted operating expenses. They believed that the type o f slack and level 
that it applied to depended on the type o f control system used. From their study they 
concluded that almost all firms-whether centralized or decentralized—utilized slack.
In a more recent study, Young (1985) measured budgetary slack. He defined 
as the difference between a subordinate's self-report o f his/her best estimate of 
productive capability, given the information that he/she has about uncertainty, and the 
actual standard selected.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Merchant (1985) found that managers used slack for discretionary purposes or 
as a buffer against difficult situations. Later, Dunk (1993) discovered that citcr 
introducing slack into the budget, the manager could use it to increase his/her personal 
compensation or to protect the profitability of the firm.
Table 2.1 summarizes relevant findings of previous research on budgetary
slack.
Budget Participation
Searfoss and Monczka (1973) conducted a field study in five manufacturing 
divisions of five heavy duty electrical equipment, pharmaceutical, and automotive 
organizations. The sample group consisted of 23 plant superintendents, 75 general 
foremen, and 267 foremen. A questionnaire measured perceived participation, 
motivation to achieve the budget, need for independence, level o f authoritarianism, 
and position in the organizational hierarchy for each individual.
Searfoss and Monczka found a highly significant positive relationship between 
perceived participation and the goal-directing element of motivation. They also found 
a significant relationship between perceived participation and effort expended in 
interacting with subordinates regarding the budget. This agreed with previous findings 
by Vroom and Yetters (1973). Additionally, they discovered a moderately significant 
between perceived participation and evaluative effort. The results 
empirically supported the contentions of Hanson (1966) and Dunbar (1971) that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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participation in the budget process influenced the motivation (effort) to achieve the 
budget.
Brownell and Mclnnes (1986) surveyed 224 middle-level managers from a 
variety of areas in three companies. The top management of each company selected 
the sample. The survey yielded 108 usable questionnaires. Brownell and Mclnnes 
had hypothesized that motivation moderated the relationship between participation and 
performance. They utilized Mahoney's (1965) performance measure, Brownell's 
(1983) motivation measure, and Milani's (1975) participation measure. Brownell and 
Mclnnes found a strong relationship between participation and performance, but they 
attributed only a small part of the link to the path through motivation.
Kirby et al. (1991) and Dunk (1993) cited the 1986 Brownell and Mclnnes 
study showing that participation in the budget process could improve planning and 
benefit the company. Magee (1980) found that participation could provide an avenue 
for managers to obtain local information that would result in improved budgets.
Budget Emphasis
Hofstede (1968) defined budget emphasis as pressure applied by superiors to 
obtain the budgetary numbers set forth prior to an accounting period. Lowe and Shaw 
(1968) found evidence that managers would alter their sales budget forecasts to 
increase the chance o f meeting the budget and to better their own interests. When 
upper-level managers emphasized the attainment o f budget goals, lower-level
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managers created slack; they included slack as a normal part of budgeting for both the 
costs and the revenue amounts in a budget.
Hofstede (1968) defined budget emphasis as the amount of weight applied to 
obtaining the budgetary numbers set forth prior to an accounting period. Budget 
emphasis increased motivation, but at the same time it increased pressure. This 
increased pressure lowered job satisfaction (Hofstede, 1968).
Lowe and Shaw (1968) examined the sales forecasts of nine area managers in a 
single retail chain over a two-year period. Changing the reward system for the second 
year placed more emphasis on the budgeted forecast developed by area managers. 
From this, Lowe and Shaw found evidence that managers would alter their sales 
budget forecasts to better their own interests.
Hopwood (1972) found that cost-center heads in budget-constrained 
departments used informal information systems to aid budgeting. Hopwood 
conducted his study using one manufacturing division of a large company based in 
Chicago. He gave questionnaires to 193 persons in charge of cost centers. O f those 
193 persons, 167 (87%) returned usable responses. He selected 20 of the 167 
responding cost-center heads for interviews.
Hopwood grouped the cost-center heads into four evaluative styles:
1) Budget constrained style: meeting the budget, but not concerned with 
costs,
2) Budget-Profit style: both meeting the budget and concerned with costs,
3) Profit Conscious style: concerned with costs, but not meeting the budget,
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4) Nonaccounting style: neither meeting the budget nor concerned with costs. 
Hopwood found that the evaluative style of the superior had a significant impact on 
the subordinate. The budget constrained style (which placed the most emphasis on the 
budget) proved most likely to cause data manipulation by subordinates.
Otley (1978) studied, by interview and questionnaire, 41 unit mangers and 
their staff employed by a large production company in the United Kingdom. The 
questionnaire asked managers to rank the three items they believed their group 
managers used as evaluation criteria. He found a significant positive relationship 
between supervisory style (the amount of emphasis placed on the budget) and 
budgetary performance. However, budget-related tension did not significantly 
correlate with supervisory style.
Hirst (1982) studied job related tension (JRT). He found a linear relationship 
between JRT and budget emphasis which was negative for low task uncertainty and 
positive for high task uncertainty. Brownell (1987) found that situations which 
included budget emphasis and low environmental complexity enhanced job 
satisfaction and performance.
Merchant (1981) sent questionnaires to 201 managers selected by senior 
corporate officials at the respective companies. He received 170 responses, for an 85 
percent response rate. The managers represented 19 different firms in the electronics 
industry. Merchant found partial support for the hypothesis that linked more emphasis 
on budgeting to higher levels of motivation by managers. He also found that the 
degree of decentralization positively correlated with budget emphasis.
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Dunk (1993) used Hopwood's (1972) eight-item measure in his examination of 
budget emphasis, information asymmetry, budgetary participation, and slack. Dunk 
developed a Likert scale for each of the eight items. His findings suggested that 
participation could reduce slack under conditions of high budget emphasis. This did 
not agree with Brownell's (1982) findings.
Perceived Environmental Uncertainty
In 1962 Gamer defined the uncertainty of an event as "the logarithm of the 
number of possible outcomes the event can have . . . . "  Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) 
stated that uncertainty contained three components: 1) the lack of clarity of 
information, 2) the long time span of definitive feedback, and 3) the general 
uncertainty of causal relationships. Lawrence and Lorsch considered the perception of 
uncertainty more important in decision making than the actual uncertainty. Thompson 
(1967) stated that uncertainty constituted one of the fundamental problems of a 
complex organization. Both authors defined the essence of management as coping 
with that uncertainty.
Duncan (1972) surveyed individuals in 10 manufacturing organizations and 12 
research and development organizations. He “pooled” the individual responses from 
each organization as one response. To measure uncertainty Duncan constructed a six- 
item instrument using a five-point Likert scale. The results of the study indicated that 
individuals making decisions in complex environments experienced more uncertainty 
than decision makers in less complex environments. Duncan also found significance
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in the perceived uncertainty differences between decision units with simple and 
complex environments, but only in a dynamic environment. In non-dynamic 
environments, perceived uncertainty did not differ.
Galbraith (1973), Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), and Thompson (1967) found 
that objective reality determined an organization's environment. These researchers 
believed that the external environment exerted the main influence on decision making. 
Later, researchers Tung (1979) and Milliken (1987) agreed that internal factors 
influenced a decision maker. Milliken (1987) pointed to inconsistencies in previous 
research on environmental uncertainty, and he noted that these inconsistencies made it 
difficult to interpret the results.
Relationships Among the Variables
Budgetary Slack and Budget 
Participation
Schiff and Lewin (1970) showed that subordinates could build budgetary slack 
into their performance standards through participation. Christensen‘s work (1982) 
appeared to support Schiff and Lewin (1970). He found that managers frequently used 
their superior knowledge to create slack when asked to participate in setting 
performance standards.
Young (1985) supported Schiff and Lewin (1970) with his findings that 
subordinates who participated in budgeting built slack into the budget. Young 
performed an experiment with 40 MBA students, with teams of three students playing 
the roles of manager, foreman, and administrator. The experiment included a training
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session and three task phases, with the subjects assigned the tasks of constructing toys 
and estimating productive capabilities. The results of the experiment supported 
Young's hypothesis that when allowed to participate in budgetary standard setting, 
subjects would build slack into the budget.
Merchant (1985) failed to support the results of Young (1985) and Schiff and 
Lewin (1970). He found that when allowed to participate in the budgetary process, 
subordinates exhibited less likelihood of creating slack in the budget. Merchant 
mailed surveys to 201 managers from 19 organizations in the electronics 
manufacturing industry. He interviewed senior corporate officials to identify 
prospective participants from each organization. The corporate officials sent letters to 
the sample managers in order to increase the response rate. Merchant received 170 
(85%) usable responses. Merchant used Onsi's (1973) four-item instrument to 
measure slack and his own (1981) instrument to measure participation. The results 
strongly supported his hypothesis that managers who participated in the budgeting 
process created less budgetary slack.
Dunk (1990) appeared to support Schiff and Lewin (1970) when he found that 
participation raised the potential for slack creation in the budget. Dunk sent 
questionnaires to 30 cost-center managers from randomly selected companies in the 
United Kingdom. After contacting each manager by phone, he received responses 
from 26 managers (86%). Dunk had hypothesized that budgetary participation 
agreement on evaluation criteria would affect managerial performance. The results o f 
the analysis supported his hypothesis. He concluded that subordinates who
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participated in the budget process may have manipulated the process to obtain easier 
operating budgets.
In another study Dunk (1993) selected 61 companies with over 100 employees 
each located in the Sydney, Australia, metropolitan area. He initially telephoned 118 
managers from any area of responsibility. He mailed questionnaires to all 118 
managers, and 79 (67%) responded. Dunk found that participation alone did not 
increase the amount of budget slack. The respondents characterized the relationship 
between participation and slack as "contingent" on the amount of budget emphasis. 
Participation may have induced subordinates to incorporate slack in budgets, but 
participation alone did not prove sufficient.
Budgetary Slack and Budget Emphasis
Management pressure to meet budgeted numbers and show yearly profit 
growth constitute one of the main reasons why managers create budgetary slack (Onsi, 
1973). Schiff and Lewin (1968) studied the division president, vice presidents of 
marketing and production, and controller at three Fortune 100 companies. Their study 
found that when their superiors emphasized the attainment of budget goals, managers 
incorporated slack into both the cost and revenue components of their budgets.
Otley (1978) found that when the superior's managerial style placed more 
emphasis on budgeted amounts, the budget estimates tended to represent a "lower 
standard o f performance." Otley attributed this to "a manager's natural desire to be 
cautious and to protect himself against unforeseen circumstances."
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Merchant (1985) found that the propensity to create slack appeared to increase 
as managers responded to pressure to meet the budget. Employee evaluations based 
on budgetary measures could have increased the propensity to create budgetary slack 
(Baiman and Lewis, 1989).
Budget Emphasis and Budget 
Participation
Lowe and Shaw (1968) found that under conditions of budget emphasis 
combined with participation, sales people used that participation to bias sales forecasts 
and build slack. With salary increases and promotions based on performance relative 
to the budget, sales managers found it in their favor to negotiate lower sales budgets. 
Hopwood (1972) found that budget participation could moderate the negative 
psychological effects of high budget emphasis. Merchant (1981) found a strong 
positive relationship between budgetary emphasis combined with participation and 
budget size.
Brownell (1982) administered questionnaires to 48 managers from a single 
large manufacturing company in California. They selected the managers-on the basis 
of availability-from eight separate functional areas, with each involved in at least one 
phase of production or distribution. All had cost-center responsibility. Brownell 
hypothesized that a budget-focused leadership style would perform more effectively 
under conditions of high participation, but less effectively under conditions of low 
participation. He found that budget participation moderated the impact of budget
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emphasis by superiors. Brownell concluded that high participation in the budgeting 
process should coincide with high budget emphasis.
Hirst (1983) tried to replicate Hopwood's (1972) study. He found no 
interaction between performance and budget emphasis combined with participation. 
Brownell (198S) found that budget emphasis and functional area did not interact to 
affect managerial performance. He did find that participation and functional area 
interacted to affect managerial performance.
Budgetary Slack and Perceived 
Environmental Uncertainty
Avoiding uncertainty motivated managers to create slack (Schiff and Lewin). 
According to Dunk (1993), the amount of slack that the manager required to control 
for uncertainty, or "absorb" it, depended on the degree of uncertainty. Nouri (1994) 
stated that the prevalence of surrounding uncertainties constituted one of the main 
reasons creating budgetary slack.
Nouri sent questionnaires to 203 supervisors and managers from large 
multinational organizations, mainly in the chemical and oil industries. Management 
selected the participants for the sample, and 139 persons (or 68.5 percent) furnished 
usable responses. Nouri used Onsi's (1973) four-item instrument to measure the 
propensity to create budgetary slack, Mowday's (1979) nine-item instrument to 
measure organizational commitment, and Kanungo's (1982) 10-item instrument to 
measure job involvement. He found a significant interaction between the role of 
motivational factors and the manager's propensity to create budgetary slack.
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Broadscope Managerial Accounting 
Systems and Perceived Environmental 
Uncertainty
Managers have created new information systems to assist them in coping with 
perceived uncertainty (Gordon and Miller, 1976; Hayes, 1977; Ewusi-Mensah, 1981). 
They sought additional information when their perceived environmental uncertainty 
increased (Gordon and Narayanan, 1983). Galbraith (1973) concluded that managers 
in complex and uncertain environments should use more information such as that 
produced by broadscope managerial accounting systems. He suggested that additional 
information aided managers in controlling for complexities and uncertainty.
Chenhall and Morris (1986) hypothesized an indirect relationship between the 
perceived usefulness of broadscope managerial accounting system and perceived 
environmental uncertainty. They used Duncan’s 1973 measure to gauge uncertainty, 
and they constructed an instrument to measure the perceived usefulness of broadscope 
managerial accounting systems. Chenhall and Morris found a significant association 
between a broadscope managerial accounting system and perceived environmental 
uncertainty. They concluded that their results supported the contention that "managers 
facing uncertainty should be provided with information to improve their decision 
response time and to aid in environmental scanning."
Kren (1992) hypothesized that as volatility increased, budgetary participation 
would increase, and the link between information and performance would get stronger. 
The results o f his study, however, did not support this hypothesis. He concluded that
L ______________________________________________________________________________________________________
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managers working in volatile environments would have to maximize the use of 
available information.
Broadscope Managerial Accounting 
Systems and Budgetary Slack
Christensen (1982) stated that when a subordinate has more information than 
the superior, "the subordinate has an obvious incentive to cheat." Young (1985) found 
no significant difference between the mean amount of slack created by those who had 
private information and the mean amount of slack created by those who did not have 
private information. However, he did find that those who had private information had 
more variation in slack production than those without private information.
Young (1985) noted that "the mere existence of private information does not 
directly cause slack, rather the level of social pressure will also determine the extent of 
slack." In a participative budget environment, subordinates with private information 
had more variance in the amount of slack, but not any more than average (Young,
1985). The effectiveness of information technology at predicting future outcomes 
could be systematically related "to the propensity to create budgetary slack."
Companies might reduce slack if they found better ways to detect it such as "investing 
in more and better information systems" (Merchant, 1985). Kirby et al. (1991) found 
no reason for managers with perfect information to have any budget slack.
Chenhall and Morris (1986) suggested that a broadscope managerial 
accounting system could help by focusing the information on the sources of 
uncertainty. However, managerial accounting systems designed to include many
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sources of information, proved relevant to managers who perceived uncertain 
environments (Chenhall and Morris, 1986).
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manufacturing firms. They selected managers immediately below CEO’s. The sample 
contained 154 managers from 96 companies with 80 managers furnishing usable 
responses. Kren examined whether or not job-relevant information acted as an 
intervening variable to budget participation and job performance. Kren used 
Mahoney's (1965) self-measure of performance, Milani's (1975) measure of budget 
participation, and a modified version of O'Reilly's 1980 measure o f Job-relevant 
information. Kren had hypothesized that information would intervene in the 
relationship between budgetary participation and managerial performance. The results 
of the study supported his hypothesis. Kren concluded that budgetary participation 
influenced the amount of information that a manager acquired.
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Table 2.1. Synopsis of Broadscope Managerial Accounting Systems Literature
STUDY FINDINGS
Burns (1968) The conceptions of accounting held by a decision-maker 
affectea selection of a rule for reaching a set of decisions. 
Accounting information—both a decision input and an objective
(goal) sought by a decision-maker-affected decisions.
Gordon & Miller Management needed access to indepth information on the
(1976) activities of competitors
Hayes (1977) Additional non-financial data significantly aided decision 
making by managers.
Larker (19S i ) Additional non-financial data, referred to as broadscope, 
significantly aided decision making by managers.
Gordon et al. Broadscope information did not prove especially useful for all
(1978) decisions.
Chenhall & Morris Broadscope information needed by managers included
(1986) economic data such as G.N.P., total market sales, and 
company's share o f that market. It also included noneconomic 
data such as demographic factors, consumer tastes, competitors' 
actions, and technological advances. Both decentralized and 
centralized managers found broadscope information helpful in 
decision making.
Mia & Chenhall Managerial accounting systems have evolved to include non-
(1994) financial data and enable managers to make more informed 
decisions.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 2.2. Synopsis of Budgetary Slack Literature
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STUDY FINDINGS
Onsi (1973) 80% of the managers admitted bargaining for 
slack in the budgets. No operating budget had 
zero slack in any year.
Schiff & Lewin (1968) Managers created slack in budgets through a 
process of understating revenues and overstating 
costs.
Schiff & Lewin (1970) The type and level o f slack depended on the type 
control system used.
Young (1985) Managers used slack for discretionary purposes 
or as a buffer against bad times.
Merchant (1985) The use of a formal budget process did not 
increase the propensity to create slack.
Dunk (1993) After introducing budgetary slack into the 
budget, the manager could use it to increase 
personal compensation or to protect the 
profitability of the firm.
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Table 2.3. Synopsis of Budgetary Participation Literature
STUDY FINDINGS
Searfoss & Monczka A highly significant positive relationship between
(1973) Perceived participation and the goal-directing effort 
element of motivation were positively related.
Hanson (1966) Participation in the budget process influenced the 
motivation (effort) to achieve the budget.
Magee (1980) Participation could provide an avenue for managers to 
obtain local information that would improve budgets.
Brownell & Mclnnes A strong relationship between participation and
(1986) performance, with only a small part of the link, due to 
the path through motivation, was reported.
Kirby etal. (1991) Participation in the budget process could improve 
planning and benefit the company.
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STUDY FINDINGS
Hofstede (1968) Budget emphasis reflected the weight applied to 
obtaining the budgetary numbers set forth prior to an 
accounting period.
Lowe & Shaw (1968) Area managers altered their sales budget forecasts to 
better their own interests.
Hopwood (1972) The budget constrained style that placed the most 
emphasis on the budget had the most likelihood of 
causing data manipulation by subordinates.
Otley (1978) A significant positive relationship between supervisory 
style (the amount of emphasis placed on the budget) and 
budgetary performance was reported.
Merchant (1981) Placing more emphasis on budgeting coincided with 
higher levels of motivation by the managers.
Dunk (1993) Under conditions of high budget emphasis, participation 
could reduce slack.
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Table 2.5. Synopsis of Perceived Environmental Uncertainty Literature
STUDY FINDINGS
Gamer (1962) The uncertainty of an event equaled the logarithm of the 
number of possible outcomes the event could have.
Lawrence & Lorsch (1967) Uncertainty contained three components: 1) the lack of 
clarity of information, 2) the long time span of definitive 
feedback, and 3) the general uncertainty of causal 
relationships. The perception of uncertainty assumed 
more importance in decision making than the actual 
uncertainty.
Duncan (1972) Individuals making decisions in complex environments 
experienced more uncertainty than decision makers in 
less complex environments.
r ■----------------------------
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Table 2.6. Synopsis of Budgetary Slack and Budgetary Participation Literature
STUDY FINDINGS
Schiff & Lewin Subordinates could build budgetary slack into their standards of
(1970) performance through participation.
Christensen (1982) Agents frequently used their superior knowledge to create slack 
if asked to participate in setting performance standards.
Young (1985) Subordinates who participated in budgeting built more slack 
into the budget.
Merchant (1985) When allowed to participate in the budgetary process, 
subordinates proved less likely to create slack in the budget.
Dunk (1990) Participation increased the potential for slack creation in the 
budget.
Dunk (1993) Participation alone did not increase the amount o f budget slack. 
The relationship between participation and slack depends on the 
amount of emphasis on the budget and the information 
asymmetry. Participation may have influenced th.; extent of 
slack in budgets, but participation alone did not cause slack. 
Participative budgeting produced benefits with little evidence 
that it resulted in increased slack under conditions of high 
budget emphasis and information asymmetry.
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Table 2.7. Synopsis of Budgetary Slack and Budget Emphasis Literature
STUDY FINDINGS
Schiff & Lewin (1968) An emphasis on the attainment of budget goals resulted 
in budget slack.
Onsi (1973) Budgetary slack resulted from pressure and emphasis on 
budget attainment to evaluate performance.
Otley (1978) As superiors placed more emphasis on budgeted 
amounts, the budget estimates tended to represent a 
lower standard of performance.
Merchant (1985) The propensity to create slack appeared to increase in 
response to pressure to meet the budget.
Baiman & Lewis (1989) Employee evaluation based on budgetary measures 
could have increased the propensity to create budgetary 
slack.
I
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Table 2.8. Synopsis of Budget Emphasis and Budget Participation Literature
STUDY FINDINGS
Lowe & Shaw (1968) Budget emphasis combined with participation, allowed 
sales people to bias sales forecasts and build slack.
Hopwood (1972) Budget participation could moderate the negative 
psychological effects of high budget emphasis.
Merchant (1981) Budget size had a strong positive relationship with 
budgetary emphasis and participation.
Brownell (1982) Budgetary participation moderated the impact o f budget 
emphasis by superiors. High participation in the 
budgeting process coincided with high budget emphasis.
Hirst (1983) Performance did not interact with budget emphasis and 
participation.
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Table 2.9. Synopsis of Budgetary Slack and Perceived Environmental Uncertainty 
Literature
STUDY FINDINGS
Schiff & Lewin (1970) Avoiding uncertainty motivated managers to create 
slack.
Dunk (1993) The amount o f slack that the manager required to control 
for the uncertainty, or "absorb" it, depended on the 
degree of uncertainty.
Nouri (1994) The prevalence of uncertainties surrounding the 
department constitutes one of the main reasons for 
creating budgetary slack.
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Table 2.10. Synopsis of Broadscope Managerial Accounting Systems and
Perceived Environmental Uncertainty Literature
STUDY FINDINGS
Gordon & Miller (1976) To obtain needed information, managers created new 
information systems. That information assisted them in 
coping with the perceived uncertainty.
Gordon & Narayanan Managers sought additional information when
(1983) their perceived environmental uncertainty increased.
Galbraith (1973) Additional information aided the manager in controlling 
for the complexities and the uncertainty.
Chenhall & Morris Broadscope managerial accounting systems were
(1986) significantly associated with perceived environmental 
uncertainty. Managers facing uncertainty needed 
information to improve their decision response time and 
to aid in environmental scanning.
K ren(1992) Managers working in volatile environments had to 
maximize the use of available information.
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Table 2.11. Synopsis of Broadscope Managerial Accounting Systems and
Budgetary Slack Literature
STUDY FINDINGS
Christensen (1982) When a subordinate had more information than the 
superior, "the subordinate had an obvious incentive to 
cheat."
Young (1985) The mean amount o f slack created by those who had 
private information did not differ significantly from that 
created by those who did not have private information. 
Managers who had private information had more 
variation in slack production than those without private 
information.
Chenhall & Morris The broadscope managerial accounting system helped
(1986) by focusing the information on the sources of 
uncertainty.
Kren(1992) Budgetary participation influenced the amount of 
information that a manager required.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This chapter'presents the research methodology used in this study, which 
investigates the moderating effect of broadscope managerial systems on the 
relationships between the propensity to create budgetary slack and each of the three 
variables: budget emphasis, budgetary participation, and perceived environmental 
uncertainty. This study utilized these three variables because of the extensive previous 
research on them and on their relationships with budgetary slack. This chapter 
includes discussions of six aspects o f the research methodology:
1) research hypotheses,
2) definition and operationalization of variables,
3) research instrument,
4) research design,
5) reliability and validity considerations, and
6) statistical techniques used.
Research Hypotheses
The formal hypotheses presented in this chapter relate to the Chapter 2 
literature review concerning the propensity to create budgetary slack. They address
37
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influences o f broadscope managerial systems, budget emphasis, budget participation, 
and environmental uncertainty on budgetary slack. Figure 3.1 (end o f this chapter) 
illustrates the hypothesized relationships among the research variables. The specific 
hypotheses regarding these relationships follow.
H, Budget Participation will be positively associated with the propensity to create
Budget Slack.
The more a manager participates in the budget process, the more opportunity 
he or she will have to create budget slack. As the opportunity increases, the amount of 
slack will increase.
H2 Budget Emphasis will be positively associated with the propensity to create
Budget Slack.
Lower-level management would tend to feel pressure to meet budgets as upper-
level management emphasizes them as control tools. Increased emphases by superiors
on meeting budget, will increase subordinates’ propensity to create slack.
H3 Perceived Environmental Uncertainty will be positively associated with the
propensity to create Budget Slack.
The environment will influence managers’ reactions to various opportunities 
and challenges. Managers at all levels should understand the relative certainty or 
uncertainty of the environment, as well as the effects that different events could have 
on actual performance. Upper-level management should then hold lower-level 
management responsible for its response to external events, given the available means. 
With reassurance against unrealistic expectations from higher-level management, 
lower-level management would have no need for budget slack.
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H4 Broadscope Managerial Accounting Systems will decrease the influence of
Budgetary Participation on the Propensity to create Budget Slack.
Rational decisions require accurate, complete, and relevant information. 
Broadscope managerial accounting systems that include traditionally non-financial 
data can furnish much of the needed information. Properly prepared budgets based 
upon accurate, complete, and relevant information should not contain slack.
Hj Broadscope Managerial Accounting Systems will decrease the influence of
Budgetary Emphasis on the Propensity to create Budget Slack.
A firm's accounting information system (Bruns, 1968) can furnish the 
necessary information for business decisions. Adequate information combined with 
proper planning and participation should make all levels o f management aware o f the 
budget’s limitations. This should temper upper-level management’s reliance upon 
budget targets. Lower-level management then would not have to create slack for 
defensive purposes.
Managers seek additional information when their perceived environmental 
uncertainty increases (Gordon and Narayanan, 1983). Both decentralized and 
centralized managers found broadscope information to be helpful in decision making 
(Chenhall and Morris, 1986). Such information may include, but is not limited to 
economic data such as G.N.P., total market sales, and company's share of that market, 
or noneconomic data such as demographic factors, consumer tastes, competitors' 
actions, and technological advances (Chenhall and Morris, 1986).
The broadscope managerial accounting systems could help by focusing the 
information on the sources of uncertainty (Chenhall and Morris, 1986). However
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when the managerial accounting system is designed to include many sources of 
information it can be relevant to managers who perceive their environment to be 
uncertain (Chenhall and Morris, 1986).
Managerial accounting systems have evolved to include traditionally non- 
financial data focusing on functional areas and predictive information to enable 
managers to make more informed decisions (Mia and Chenhall, 1994).
Mia and Chenhall argue,
that if managers use broadscope information supplied by an managerial 
accounting system, then given comparable decision-making skills, their 
application of the information should provide a relative advantage in 
performing their managerial tasks and assist in improving their performance.
Mia and Chenhall concluded that the performance evaluation o f a manager who is in
an uncertain environment is higher when that manager uses a broadscope managerial
accounting system. Based on these findings, the following hypothesis is proposed:
H6 Broadscope Managerial Accounting Systems will decrease the influence o f 
Perceived Environmental Uncertainty on the Propensity to create slack.
When accounting information systems include data relevant to otherwise
uncertain conditions, managers can more confidently develop comprehensive plans.
As a manager’s confidence increases, she or he will have less need for budget slack.
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Operationalization of Variables
This study employs prevalent definitions from prior studies on the respective 
variables. It also utilizes established scales-in their original forms--from that research 
to measure each of the variables and to ensure comparability to prior studies.
Broadscope Managerial 
Accounting Systems
Broadscope Managerial Accounting Systems include traditionally non- 
financial data that focus on functional areas and predictive types of information (Mia 
and Chenhall, 1994). This information may include economic data such as G.N.P., 
total market sales, and company's share of that market. It also may include 
noneconomic data such as demographic factors, consumer tastes, competitors' actions, 
and technological advances (Chenhall and Morris, 1986).
This study has measured broadscope managerial accounting systems through a 
six-item questionnaire developed by Chenhall and Morris (1986) and adapted by Mia 
and Chenhall (1994). The questionnaire asked the subjects to indicate how much they 
used broadscope managerial accounting system information when making various 
organizational decisions. The respondents indicated the extent to which they used the 
information provided by their company's managerial accounting system. The 
questionnaire asked for answers based on a seven-point Likert scale. A response of 1 
indicated the lowest use of broadscope managerial accounting systems, while a 
response o f 7 indicated the highest use o f broadscope managerial accounting system.
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The responses were summed and averaged to yield an overall score. Table 3.1 shows 
the broadscope managerial accounting system scale.
Budgetary Slack
Budgetary slack equals excess resource requirements or understatements of 
capabilities that managers purposely build into their operating budgets (Young, 1985). 
The reader should not confuse (intentional) budgetary slack with (unintentional) 
budgetary errors.
This study obtained information on managers' propensity to create budgetary 
slack through a questionnaire survey. The questionnaire used Onsi’s (1973) four-item 
scale to measure that propensity. Respondents described each item’s frequency of 
occurrence, with scores ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (always). Table 3.2 illustrates the 
budgetary slack scale.
Budget Participation
Milani (p. 274,1975) has defined participation as "the extent to which a 
subordinate is allowed to select his own courses of action." This study has measured 
budgetary participation through a three-item questionnaire developed by Milani 
(1975). The respondents answered—in terms of a five-point Likert scale--the extent to 
which they believe they participated in the budgetary process. A response of 1 
indicated the lowest amount of emphasis, while a response of 5 indicated the greatest 
amount of emphasis on the budgeted goals. The summed and averaged responses for 
each item created the overall score. Table 3.3 shows the budgetary emphasis scale.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
43
Budget Emphasis
Hofstede (1968) defined budget emphasis as the amount of weight applied to 
obtaining the budgetary numbers set forth prior to an accounting period. This study 
will measure budget emphasis through a four-item instrument developed by Hopwood 
(1972). The respondents have indicated—according to a five-point Likert scale—the 
extent to which they believe their superiors stressed the attainment of budgeted goals. 
A response of 1 indicated the lowest amount o f emphasis, while a response of 5 
indicated the greatest amount of emphasis on the budgeted goals. The responses for 
each item were summed and averaged to obtain an overall score. Table 3.4 shows the 
budgetary emphasis scale.
Perceived Environmental Uncertainty
Uncertainty can arise from three scenarios: 1) insufficiency of information,
2) difficulty in assessing consequences, and 3) inability to assign probabilities 
(Duncan, 1972). Participants measured perceived environmental uncertainty through a 
12-item questionnaire developed by Duncan (1972) and shown to have acceptable 
reliability by Downey et al. (1972).
The subjects responded to 12 perceived environmental uncertainty questions, 
grading them on a five-point Likert scale that ranged from never (1) to always (5). 
Table 3.5 presents the perceived environmental uncertainty scale.
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Research Instrument
Appendix A illustrates the research instrument. Section 1 collected 
demographic data; section 2 surveyed budgetary participation; section 3 measured 
performance; and section 4 measured budget emphasis, budget slack, uncertainty, and 
broadscope managerial accounting system use. The 43-item research instrument was 
administered as a paper-and-pencil self-report questionnaire.
Scale Reliability and 
Validity
This study measured the constructs included in the proposed model and 
illustrated in Figure 3.1. Previous studies had evaluated and reported the reliability 
and validity of the instruments used. This section is a discussion of the reliability and 
validity of those scales.
Churchill (1991) defined measurement as "rules for assigning numbers to 
objects to represent quantities of attributes" (p. 1042). "Valid measurement is the sine 
qua non of science" (Peter, 1979, p. 6). In order for any research to yield acceptable 
results, it should employ reliable and valid measures. Peter (1979) defined reliability 
as "the degree to which measures are free from error and therefore yield consistent 
results" (p. 6). Validity "refers to the degree to which instruments truly measure the 
constructs which they intended to measure" (Peter, 1979, p. 6). Peter also specified 
reliability as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for validity.
This study examined how the use of broadscope managerial accounting 
systems moderates the influence of budgetary participation, budgetary emphasis, and
b _____________________________________________________________________________________________________
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perceived environmental uncertainty on the propensity to create budgetary slack.
Table 3.6 summarizes the reliabilities and validities reported in past studies for the 
items used in the current study.
Research Design
The study used a mail questionnaire (see Appendix). The sampling frame 
consisted of 2000 managers working in the United States. The principal researcher 
purchased the sample from a mailing list company, and a professional mailer posted 
the questionnaires to the participants with a cover letter (Appendix B) and a prepaid- 
postage return envelope. The cover letter explained the purpose of the study, assured 
the respondents o f confidentiality and anonymity, and asked for cooperation in filling 
out the survey. Approximately four weeks after the first mailing, the professional 
mailer sent a second questionnaire to each non-respondent in the sample to increase 
the response rate.
Applied Statistical Techniques
The primary statistical technique to test the hypotheses was a moderated
multiple regression analysis. According to Saunders (1956),
. . .  there are many examples of situations in which the predictive validity of a 
certain psychological measure varies systematically in accord with some other 
independent psychological variable (p. 209).
This study treats budget participation, budget emphasis, and environmental uncertainty
as dependent variables. Their predictive values for variations in budgetary slack
propensity should change with the use of broadscope managerial accounting systems.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
46
Zedeck (1971) suggested that the moderated regression techniques involved
prediction equations for the total sample. Zedeck stated that techniques
. . .  do not require explicit subgrouping or differentiating of individuals. The 
moderated regression equation contains a higher-order term such as an XZ 
cross-product or X. A test is made to determine whether the higher-order term 
in the moderated regression equation contributes to prediction beyond that of 
the ordinary linear regression equation (without the additional higher-order 
term).
Moderator variables comprise a subset o f a category of variables. Sharma, 
Durand and Gur-Arie (1981, p. 291) defined a moderator variable as "one which 
systematically modifies either the form and/or strength of the relationship between a 
predictor and a criterion variable." They developed a typology of specification 
variables based on Zedeck's (1971) analysis.
As illustrated in Figure 3.2, this typology of moderator variables used two 
dimensions. One dimension classifies specification variables based on whether or not 
they relate to the criterion variable. The second dimension characterizes specification 
variables by how it interacts with the predictor variable (Sharma, Durand and Gur- 
Arie, 1981). An intervening (or exogenous, antecedent, or suppressor) variable does 
not interact with the predictor variable but relates to the criterion and/or predictor 
variable (Quadrant 1). Moderator variables fall into Quadrants 2 ,3 , or 4. Moderator 
variables in Quadrant 2 (homologizers) modify the strength of the relationship 
between the predictor and criterion variables, whereas moderators in Quadrant 3 
(quasi-moderators) and Quadrant 4 (pure moderators) affect the form of the 
relationship (Sharma, Durand and Gur-Arie, 1981). Homologizers do not interact with
[____________________________________________________________________________________________
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the predictor variable and do not significantly relate to the predictor or criterion 
variable. Quasi-moderators interact significantly with the predictor variable and relate 
to the criterion variable. Pure moderators significantly interact with the predictor 
variable but have an insignificant relationship with the criterion variable.
Sharma, Durand and Gur-Arie (1981) also proposed a framework for 
identifying moderator variables based on their typology of specification variables. 
Figure 3.3 illustrates this framework, which was used to identify moderator variables 
in the current study.
Three regressions were performed for each hypothesis. Y was designated as 
the dependent (criterion) variable, X as the independent (predictor) variable, and Z as 
the hypothesized moderator for the following regressions:
(1) Y = B0 + B,X
(2) Y = B0 + B,X + B2Z
(3) Y = B0 + B,X + B2Z + B3XZ
The entry order of the variables was controlled-Z second and XZ last in 
equation (3); Z after X in equation (2)~to exactly match the three equations. The 
significance o f the partial regression coefficients from equation (3) served to test the 
hypotheses.
As Sharma, Durand and Gur-Arie (1981) suggested, Z serves as a quasi 
moderator if B3 and B2 are significant. If B3 is statistically significant but B2 is not, Z 
is a pure moderator. Additionally, if B3 is not significant, the following regressions 
should be performed:
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(4)X  = B0 + B,Z
(5)Y = B0 + B,Z
If B, is significant in either equations (4) or (5), Z is an antecedent, exogenous, 
intervening, or suppressor variable. A subgroup analysis is recommended if B, is not 
significant in either equation.
Chapter Summary
This chapter addressed issues of measurement data gathering. Also presented 
was the measurement of each research variable and the instrument used to do so. It 
also included a description of the data gathering procedures and the methods of 
statistical analysis employed in testing the hypotheses.
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Hypotheses H, and R,:
+
Budget P a r tic ip a tio n ----------------------- ^ ---------------------------------->  Budget Slack
Broadscope Managerial Accounting Systems
Hypotheses Hz and H}:
+
Budget Emphasis-------------------------------y ---------------------------------- > Budget Slack
Broadscope Managerial Accounting Systems
Hypotheses H3 and H^
+
Perceived Environmental Uncertainty ^ ---------------------------------- > Budget Slack
Broadscope Managerial Accounting Systems
Figure 3.1. Models o f Relationships Among Variables
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Related to Not Related
















with (“Quasi” Moderator) (“Pure" Moderator)
Predictor
Variable
Figure 3.2. Typology of Specification Variables 
Source: Shavara, Durand, and Guo-Arie (1981)
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Figure 3.3 Framework for Identifying Moderator Variables 
Source: Shavara, Durand, and Guo-Arie (1981)
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Table 3.1. Broadscope Managerial Accounting System Use Scale Items'
1. Information which relates to possible future events (e.g., future government 
trade policies).
2. Information on the likelihood (quantified) of future events occurring (e.g., 
probability estimates).
3. Information of a non-economic nature such as customer preferences, employee 
attitudes, labor relations, attitudes of government and consumer bodies, 
competitive threats.
4. Information on broad factors external to their organization such as economic 
conditions, population growth, technological developments.
5. Information of a non-fmancial nature related to production activities such as 
output rates, scrap levels, machine efficiency, employee absenteeism.
6. Information related to product markets such as market size, growth in market 
share.
* Measured on a scale of 1 to 5, where 
1 = Strongly Disagree 
5 = Strongly Agree
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Table 3.2. Propensity to Create Slack Scale Items*
53
1. To protect himself, a manager submits a budget that can safely be attained.
2. The plant manager sets two levels of standards: one between himself and 
production (sales) manager, and another standard between himself and top 
management, to be safe.
3. In good business times, the plant manager accepts a reasonable level of slack in 
a departmental budget.
4. Slack in the budget is good to do things that cannot be officially approved.
* Measured on a scale of 1 to 5, where 
1 = Strongly Disagree 
5 = Strongly Agree
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Table 3.3. Budget Participation Scale Items*
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1. I am involved in setting all portions of my budget.
2. My budget is not final until I am satisfied with it.
3. My opinion is an important factor in setting my budget.
* Measured on a scale of 1 to 7, where 
1 = Strongly Disagree 
7 = Strongly Agree
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Table 3.4. Budget Emphasis Scale Items*
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1. Top management judges the plant performance only on the basis o f attaining 
budget profits.
2. Top management hates nothing more than a plant manager failing to meet his 
budget.
3. Top management believes in the merits of exerting pressure on middle 
management.
4. If a plant manager fails in attaining his budget, top management takes the 
position that he should be replaced.
* Measured on a scale of 1 to 5, where 
1 = Strongly Disagree 
5 = Strongly Agree
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Table 3.5. Environmental Uncertainty Scale Items*
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Part I. Lack of information regarding environmental factors.
1. How often do you feel that you have the information needed to understand the 
impact of your decision on this factor or vice versa?
2. How often do you believe that the information you have about this factor is 
adequate for decision making?
3. How difficult is it for you to get the necessary information about this factor for 
decision making?
4. How difficult is it to obtain additional information about this factor when you 
need it for decision making?
5. How often can you determine what the outcome of a decision will be before it 
is made?
6. Which most nearly describes the typical length of time involved before you can 
obtain feedback or information concerning the effects of your decision on the 
project? 1 day, 2 days, 1 week, 1 month, 6 months, 1 year, 2 years +
Part II. Not knowing the outcome of a decision and its losses if  incorrect.
1. How often do you feel that you are unable to predict how this factor is going to 
be reacted to, or be affected by, decisions made in the project or the Systems 
Command?
2. Is it frequently difficult to know whether this factor will be reacted to, or be 
affected by, a decision before the decision has actually been made?
3. How often do you feel that you can consider alternative courses of action 
before making a decision to follow a specific course o f action?
4. How often do you feel that you can effectively consider the consequences of 
making decisions before they are made?
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Table 3.5 (continued)
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5. How often do you feel that you are able to tell if the decisions you make will
have a positive or negative effect on your project's overall performance?
Part III. Inability to assign probabilities.
1. To summarize your beliefs about each of the three factors, indicate your
"sureness" as to how each of these factors is going to affect the success or 
failure o f your project. Indicate your "sureness" with a circle on the scale o f 0 
to 10 where absolutely unsure = 0, completely sure = 10. Then please note the 
range that you were considering in indication your sureness.
* Measured on a scale of 1 to 5, where 
1 = Never 
5 = Always
T l ■ ■  '  —  ■ -  I
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Table 3.6. Reliability and Validity Reported in Previous Studies
SCALES STUDY RELIABILITY
Broadscope Chenhall &
Managerial Morris (1985) Alpha .76
Accounting Mia & Chenhall
(1994) Alpha .59
Budget Slack Onsi (1973) n/a
Merchant (1985) Alpha .70
Nouri (1994) Alpha .75
Participation Milani (1975) n/a
Brownell (1982) Alpha .78





Kren (1992) Alpha .85
Dunk (1993) Alpha .88
Budget Hopwood (1972) n/a
Emphasis Dunk (1993) n/a
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CHAPTER 4
PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA
This chapter presents and analyzes the data used in this study. The first section 
contains characteristics of the sample, followed by an analysis of possible non­
response bias. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrices for the variables in the 
study are also provided. The second section presents the results of the moderated 
regression analyses that test the hypotheses developed in Chapter 3. The final section 
contains concluding remarks regarding data analyses.
Characteristics of the Sample
The sampling frame consisted of 2,000 randomly selected managers from 
Fortune 1,000 firms, and each one received a self-report type questionnaire. One-tenth 
(205) of those managers returned their questionnaires with 200 of them providing 
usable information. Table 4.1 summarizes selected characteristics of the respondents.
Assessment of Potential Non-response Bias
A comparison of early and late respondents on the basis of five variables- 
broadscope managerial accounting systems, budgetary slack, budget participation, 
budget emphasis, and perceived environmental uncertainty-served to ascertain
59
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non-response bias. With the sample split into two halves, an analysis of variance 
compared early versus late respondents. Tables 4.2 and 4.3 present the results.
Table 4.2 indicates no significant differences between early and late 
respondents with regard to the variables under study. Table 4.3 indicates that early 
and late respondents significantly differed in terms of their experience. However, the 
cell means indicated that the early respondents had a mean experience of 9.84 years 
versus 8.55 years for the late respondents. Although statistically significant, an 
experience difference of just over one year should not bias the results of the study. 
Early and late respondents did not differ significantly in terms of job title or company 
size based on annual sales.
Measurement Issues
According to the domain sampling model, "the purpose of any particular 
measurement is to estimate the score that would be obtained if all the items in the 
domain were used" (Churchill, 1991, p. 497). The methodology for this study actually 
employed a subset o f all the items constituting the domain of a construct. This study 
measured five constructs: use of broadscope managerial accounting systems, 
budgetary slack, budget participation, budget emphasis, and perceived environmental 
uncertainty. Previous research had used all of the scales employed in this study.
The domain sampling model states that items drawn from the domain of a 
single construct should have a high intercorrelation. Churchill (1991) noted that "a 
primary source of measurement error is the inadequate sampling of the domain of
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relevant items" (p. 497). Therefore, this study examined item-to-total correlations and 
coefficient alphas on the measures, and it estimated the initial reliability for each 
construct.
One item in the budget emphasis measure and four items in the perceived 
environmental uncertainty measure fell below .3. However, since the coefficient alpha 
of each measure exceeded .6, as recommended by Nunnally (1978), these items 
remained in the respective measures.
Broadscope Managerial 
Accounting Systems
Table 4.4 presents the initial reliability analysis of items measuring broadscope
managerial accounting systems. As the table indicates, all items met the item-to-item
total correlation as recommended by Nunnally (1978). The scale had an Alpha of .77.
Budgetary Slack
Table 4.5 presents the initial reliability analysis of items measuring budgetary 
slack. As the table indicates, all items met the item-to-item total correlation as 
recommended by Nunnally (1978). The scale had an Alpha of .82.
Budget Participation
Table 4.6 presents the initial reliability analysis of items measuring budget 
participation. As the table indicates, all items met the item-to-item total correlation as 
recommended by Nunnally (1978). The scale had an Alpha of .67.
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Budget Emphasis
Table 4.7 presents the initial reliability analysis o f items measuring budget 
emphasis. Item 1 had the lowest correlation. The scale alpha of .77 exceeded the 
minimum recommended by Nunnally (1978).
Perceived Environmental Uncertainty
Table 4.8 presents the initial reliability analysis of items measuring perceived 
environmental uncertainty. Four of the items (5, 6, 7 and 8) fell below the minimum 
level of .3 recommended by Nunnally (1978). However, the scale had an Alpha of .71 
and prior accounting research had used this scale extensively and validated it.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 4.9 presents various descriptive statistics o f broadscope managerial 
accounting systems, budget slack, budget participation, budget emphasis, and 
perceived environmental uncertainty. Participation was measured on a seven-point 
scale and all other variables on a five-point scale.
The mean score for budgetary participation suggested that respondents 
believed they participated heavily in the budget process. As indicated by the mean 
score of broadscope managerial accounting systems, they also feel that they use the 
information provided by the information system.
Tables 4.10 through 4.14 compare the means and reliabilities of the study 
variables across studies. Table 4.10 presents comparisons across studies for the 
broadscope managerial accounting systems scale. It indicates an adequate (.67)
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reliability for the current study, although it fell slightly below that of the Chenhall and 
Morris (1986). The mean broadscope managerial accounting systems score of 3.250 
compared unfavorably with the Chenhall and Morris (1986) score of 4.622.
Table 4.11 present? comparisons across studies for the budgetary slack scale; it 
indicates that the reliability for the current study for budgetary slack (.82) compared 
favorably with that of prior studies. The reliability slightly exceeded those of the two 
studies that provided reliability numbers. The mean budgetary slack value in this 
study (2.562), fell slightly lower than the Merchant (1985) study which reported a 
reliability of 2.775. The Nouri (1994) study used a seven-point scale, rendering the 
means not comparable.
Table 4.12 presents comparisons across studies for the budgetary participation 
scale. It indicates a .82 reliability for the current budgetary participation study 
compared to prior studies which ranged from .78 (Brownell, 1985) to .88 (Dunk, 1993; 
Brownell, 1985). The mean budget participation score of 5.778 slightly exceeded the 
mid-point in the range o f previous studies, from 4.298 (Brownell, 1982) to 6.067 
(Kren, 1992). Dunk (1990) used a five-point scale which did not compare with those 
of other studies, including the seven-point scale for the current study.
Table 4.14 presents a comparison across studies for the perceived 
environmental uncertainty scale. It indicates that the reliability for the current study 
(.71) matched that of the previous study of Chenhall and Morris (1986). The mean 
perceived environmental uncertainty score of 2.818 slightly exceeded the 2.110 of the
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Chenhall and Morris (1986) study, with amounts within a comparable range of each 
other.
Correlations Between Variables
Theory supported the signs of each correlation. Broadscope managerial 
accounting systems negatively related to budget slack (-.15). This indicated that as 
managers used more information, less slack was needed to be built into the budget.
The significant positive relationship between perceived environmental uncertainty and 
budgetary slack suggested that as a manager perceived less certainty in the 
environment, he/she felt the need to build more slack into the budget.
As Table 4.15 indicates, budgetary slack is significantly related to broadscope 
managerial accounting system use, perceived environmental uncertainty, and budget 
emphasis. As suggested by Sharma, Durand, and Gur-Arie (1981), these variables 
may have served as antecedents to the predictor rather than as homologizers, pure 
moderators, or quasi moderator. Budgetary slack, unexpectedly, did not significantly 
relate to budget participation.
Budget emphasis positively related to budgetary slack, as predicted from the 
previous research. This relationship indicated that as superiors placed more emphasis 
on meeting budgets, the more managers felt more need to build slack into the budget.
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Hypotheses Tests and Results
This study used the moderated multiple regression technique to test the 
research hypotheses developed in Chapter 3. Sharma, Durand, and Gur-Arie 
developed a typology of specification variables based on whether the specification 
variable modified either the form or the strength of the relationship between a 
predictor and a criterion. Figure 3.2 presents the typology proposed by Sharma, 
Durand, and Gur-Arie (1981).
Based on the topology, Sharma, Durand, and Gur-Arie (1981) developed a 
framework for identifying moderator variables. The current study used this 
framework for identifying moderator variables. Figure 3.3 presents the framework 
proposed by Sharma, Durand, and Gur-Arie (1981).
This study performed three regressions for each of three hypotheses.
(1) Y = B0 + B,X
(2) Y = B0 + B,X + B2Z
(3) Y = B0 + B,X + B2Z + B 3XZ
Y served as the dependent or criterion variable, X performed as the predictor or 
independent variable, and Z represented the hypothesized moderator.
The entry order of the variables in the regression equations exactly matched the 
three equations depicted above. As suggested by Sharma, Durand, and Gur-Arie 
(1981), statistical significance for B2 and B3 would make Z a quasi moderator. On the 
other hand, a  significant B3 was significant but a B2 not significant Z would make a 
pure moderator.
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According to Sharma, Durand, and Gur-Arie (1981), the failure o f B3 to show 
significance would require performance of the following regressions:
(4) X = B0 + B,Z
(5) Y = B„ + B,Z
A significant B, in either of equations (4) or (S) would make Z an antecedent, 
exogenous, intervening, or suppressor variable. They recommended a subgroup 
analysis if B, proved not significant in either of the equations. In the current study, X 
represented BSMAS, Y proxied Slack and Z represented Participation, Uncertainty, or 
Emphasis. Table 4.16 presents the results of the hypothesis tests.
As Table 4.16 indicates, uncertainty and emphasis are significantly and 
positively associated with budgetary slack, thereby supporting H2 and H3 Budget 
participation was not significantly associated with budgetary slack.
The partial regression coefficients of the interaction terms did not prove 
significant, thus providing no support for H4, Hs , and H6. Also, the regression 
coefficients for the main effects of the moderator (BSMAS) on the criterion variable 
(Slack) were not significant. Consequently, this study found no support for the 
hypothesized moderating effects of broadscope managerial accounting systems. As 
suggested by Sharma, Durand, and Gur-Arie (1981), this study regressed on slack to 
determine the relationship between the hypothesized moderator and slack. Table 4.17 
presents the results.
Table 4.17 shows that broadscope managerial accounting systems served as an 
antecedent, exogenous, intervening, or suppressor variables within the framework
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proposed by Sharma, Durand, and Gur-Arie (1981). Determining specifically which 
o f the four variables they served lies beyond the scope of this study.
Summary of Hypothesis Testing
Based on the review of past literature, Chapter 3 proposed six research 
hypotheses. This study found support for the expected positive influence of emphasis 
and uncertaity on budgetary slack. However, the expected positive influence of 
participation on slack was not supported. Further, the moderating effects o f the use of 
broadscope managerial accounting systems on the primary relationships o f interest 
were not supported.
Conclusion
This chapter began with a description of sample characteristics. Ten percent of 
the managers in the sample returned usable questionnaires, and the author assessed the 
possibility of non-response bias. A discussion of the purification of the measures used 
in the study followed. The study developed descriptive statistics for of the study 
variables and selected demographic variables. It then presented correlations among 
the study variables. Finally, test results for the research hypotheses was presented.
The data supported two of the hypotheses, but failed to support the remaining four.
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Range 1 to 46
Organizations 
Annual Sales $242,494,387 $80,000,000
< $1 million 23.1
$1 to $7 million 24.2
$7 to $20 million 22.6
> $20 million 30.1
Range $20,000 to $250,000,000
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F Sig. of F
Multivariate Tests
Pillais .02 .71 .61
Hotellings .02 .71 .61
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Table 4.3. Comparison of Early and Late Respondents
Test Multivariate 
Test Values
F Sig. o f F
Multivariate Tests
Pillais .24 1.68 .14
Hotellings .32 1.68 .14
Wilks .76 1.68 .14
Roys .24
Univariate Tests
Job title 1.20 .28
Experience 4.67 .04
Annual Sales .28 .60
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Table 4.4. Initial Reliability Analysis of Broadscope Managerial Accounting Systems







1 2.86 .97 .36 .63
2 2.97 1.00 .38 .62
3 3.75 .97 .45 .60
4 3.12 1.01 .50 .58
5 3.45 1.17 .32 .65
6 3.36 1.14 .36 .63
ALPHA = .67
Table 4.5. Initial Reliability Analysis of Budgetary Slack







1 2.87 1.21 .59 .79
2 2.34 1.21 .72 .73
3 2.70 1.13 .72 .73
4 2.31 1.06 .52 .82
ALPHA = .82
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Table 4.6. Initial Reliability Analysis o f Budget Participation







1 5.84 1.61 .66 .77
2 5.46 1.80 .71 .72
3 6.02 1.40 .68 .76
ALPHA = .82
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Table 4.7. Initial Reliability Analysis o f Budget Emphasis







1 3.14 1.14 .26 .80
2 3.42 1.01 .36 .77
3 2.82 1.18 .58 .72
4 2.77 1.14 .68 .69
5 3.02 1.15 .65 .70
6 2.35 1.05 .58 .72
ALPHA = .77
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Table 4.8. Initial Reliability Analysis of Perceived Environmental Uncertainty







1 2.44 .86 .47 .66
2 2.36 .78 .46 .67
3 2.91 .87 .43 .67
4 2.92 .85 .50 .66
5 2.58 .78 .22 .71
6 2.99 .78 .22 .71
7 2.94 .75 .29 .70
8 2.09 .79 .23 .71
9 2.22 .76 .50 .66
10 2.17 .64 .38 .69
ALPHA = .71
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Table 4.9. Descriptive Statistics o f Study Variables
Statistics Variables
BSMAS* SLACK* PART** EMPHS* UNCERT*
Mean 3.250 2.562 5.778 2.915 2.818
Median 3.167 2.500 6.167 2.833 2.800
Mode 3.167 2.000 7.000 2.667 3.100
Std. Dev. .663 .916 1.411 .776 .478
Kurtosis .059 -.712 2.607 .109 .484
Skewness .103 .123 -1.654 -.013 .005
Minimum 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Maximum 5.0 5.0 7.0 5.0 5.0
Range 3.333 4.0 6.0 4.0 2.900
Frequency 198 190 198 192 173
BSMAS = Use o f Broadscope Managerial Accounting Systems
SLACK = Propensity to Create Budgetary Slack
PART = Budgetary Participation
EMPHS = Budget Emphasis
UNCERT = Perceived Environmental Uncertainty
* Measured on a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 = Never, and 5 = Always.
** Measured on a scale of 1 to 7 where 1 = Strongly Disagree, and 7 = 
Strongly Agree.
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Morris (1985) 5 4.622 .59
Mia & Chenhall 
(1994) 5 4.710 .76
Current Study 5 3.250 .67
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Table 4.11. Comparison Across Studies: Budgetary Slack
Study Scale Mean Coefficient
Points Alpha
Onsi (1973) 5 n/a
Merchant (1985) 5 2.775 .70
Noun (1994) 7 3.708 .75
Current Study 5 2.562 .82
L
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Milani (1975) 7 n/a n/a
Brownell (1982) 7 4.298 .78
Brownell (1985) 7 n/a .88
Dunk (1990) 5 3.904 .87
Brownell & 
Dunk (1991) 7 5.203 .83
Kren (1992) 7 6.067 .85
Dunk (1993) 7 5.227 .88
Current Study 7 5.778 .82
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Hopwood (1972) 5 n/a n/a
Dunk (1993) 7 5.778 n/a
Current Study 5 2.915 .77
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Duncan (1972) 5 n/a n/a
Chenhall & 
Morris (1986) 5 2.110 .71
Current Study 5 2.818 .71
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Table 4.15. Correlation Coefficients
82
Variables BSMAS SLACK PART EMPHS UNCERT
BSMAS 1.00
SLACK -.15* 1.00
PART .25** -.02 1.00
EMPHS .25** .17* -.02 1.00
UNCERT -.26** .16* .13 .05 1.00
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
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Table 4.16. Standardized Coefficients of Hypothesized Relationships
(Absolute t statistics and their significance are shown in parentheses.)
: Budget Participation wall positively associate with the propensity to create
budgetary slack.
SLACK = 2.66 - .02(PART)
(-.34)
(•73)
H2: Budget emphasis will positively associate with the propensity to create
budgetary slack.
SLACK = 1.98 + .20(EMPHS)
(2.38)
(.02)
H3: Perceived environmental uncertainty will positively associate with the
propensity to create budgetary slack.
SLACK = 1.71 + .34(UNCERT)
(2.04)
(.04)
H4: The use of Broadscope Managerial Accounting systems moderates the
relationship between the propensity to create budgetary slack and budget 
participation.
SLACK = 3.82 - .10(PART) - .40(BSMAS) + .03(PART*BSMAS)
(-.49) (-1.15) (.54)
(.62) (.25) (.59)
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Table 4.16 continued
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Hs: The use of Broadscope Managerial Accounting systems moderates the
relationship between the propensity to create budgetary slack and budget 
emphasis.
SLACK = 1.74 + .63(EMPHS) + .005(BSMAS) - .11 (EMPHS*BSMAS)
(1.81) (.016) (-1.07)
(.07) (.98) (.29)
H6: The use of Broadscope Managerial Accounting systems moderates the
relationship between the propensity to create budgetary slack and perceived 
environmental uncertainty.
SLACK = 1.18 + .70(UNCERT) + .19(BSMAS) - .12(UNCERT*BSMAS)
(.97) (.33) (-.59)
(.33) (.74) (.55)
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Table 4.17. Secondary Regression Results 
(Absolute t statistics and their significance are shown in parentheses.) 
SLACK = 3.25 - .21 (BSMAS)
(-2.09)
R2 = .02 (.04)
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
The hypothesized moderating effect of broadscope managerial accounting 
systems on the relationships among the three variables of interest and the propensity to 
create budgetary slack was tested. Specifically, the researcher tested the moderating 
effects of broadscope managerial accounting systems on the influence of three factors 
on budgetary slack: budgetary participation, budget emphasis, and perceived 
environmental uncertainty.
The next section is a discussion of the findings pertaining to the variables in 
the models. The chapter then presents discussions of managerial implications, 
limitations of the study, suggestions for future research, and contributions of the study.
Research Findings
Budgetary slack had a  significant negative correlation with broadscope 
managerial accounting systems. This indicated that the use of broadscope information 
decreased the amount of slack that a manager added to his or her budget. Budgetary 
slack also significantly correlated with budgetary emphasis and perceived 
environmental uncertainty, but in a positive direction. This indicated that as
86
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uncertainty and budget emphasis increased, managers increased the amount of slack in 
their budgets.
The more managers used broadscope managerial accounting systems the less 
slack they tended to add to their budgets. The results differed from those of 
Christensen (1982), who believed just the opposite, but did not empirically test that 
supposition. They also differed from those of Young (198S), who found no difference 
between the amount of slack created by subordinates who had private information and 
those who did not. The different findings probably resulted from the fact that Young 
(1985) studied "private information" whereas this study used the information supplied 
through broadscope accounting systems.
This research found broadscope managerial accounting system use 
significantly correlated to budget participation, budget emphasis, and perceived 
environmental uncertainty. It found positive relationships between broadscope 
managerial accounting systems and both budgetary participation and budgetary 
emphasis. It found a negative relationship between broadscope managerial accounting 
systems and perceived environmental uncertainty. The directions o f these 
relationships coincided with expectations.
The current study produced no support for broadscope managerial accounting 
systems as a moderator of relationships among budgetary participation and the 
propensity to create budgetary slack, budget emphasis, or perceived environmental 
uncertainty.
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The research found budgetary emphasis significantly correlated with the 
propensity to create budgetary slack and with the use of broadscope managerial 
accounting systems. Budgetary emphasis had a significant positive association with 
the propensity to create budgetary slack. These results supported previous research 
and hypotheses.
Budgetary participation did not significantly correlate with the propensity to 
create budgetary slack. This supported the research of Merchant (1985). The results 
also showed that managers participated heavily in the budgeting process.
Perceived environmental uncertainty correlated with the propensity to create 
budgetary slack and broadscope managerial accounting system use. These results 
supported the hypothesis that managers would increase the amount of budgetary slack 
if they perceived high environmental uncertainty.
Managerial Implications
The study did not support the moderating effect of broadscope managerial 
accounting systems on the relationships studied; however, those systems had 
significantly positive correlations with budgetary participation and budget emphasis. 
This indicated that as superiors emphasized meeting the budgeted numbers and as 
subordinates participated in the budgeting process, subordinates made more use of 
broadscope managerial accounting information.
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Broadscope managerial accounting systems and perceived environmental 
uncertainty had significantly negative correlations. This indicated that as managers 
used more information they perceived less environmental uncertainty.
The findings of the research indicated that as a manager's perception of 
environmental uncertainty increased and as his superior's emphasis o f the budget 
increased, the propensity to create budgetary slack increased. This suggested that 
budgetary slack served as a protectionary measure; it supported the hypothesis that the 
use o f more information could reduce a manager’s reliance on slack.
Limitations of the Study
Although a 10 percent response rate generally has sufficed for industrial 
research, it did not rule out the possibility o f differences among the respondents and 
nonrespondents in this study. The 200 usable responses served adequately for testing 
the hypotheses with moderator regression. However, an increased response rate may 
have produced more accurate results.
The usual limitations o f survey research applied to this study, and they should 
govern interpretation of the results. However, in order to increase validity, the current 
study used established scales.
Suggestions for Future Research
This study was an empirical examination of the moderating effects of 
broadscope managerial accounting systems. It examined those effects on the 
relationships among the propensity to create budgetary slack and budgetary
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participation, budget emphasis, and perceived environmental uncertainty. Future 
research should examine different variables that broadscope managerial accounting 
systems could moderate.
The findings in this research found that broadscope managerial accounting 
systems did not serve as a moderating variable. Rather they operated as intervening, 
antecedent, exogenous, or suppressor variable according to the framework developed 
by Sharma, Durand, and Gur-Arie (1981). Future research should use the 
methodology outlined by Rosenberg (1968) to determine which one of the four 
broadscope managerial accounting systems actually represent.
Contributions of the Study
This study has provided empirical evidence of the interactions between 
broadscope managerial accounting systems, budgetary slack, budgetary participation, 
budget emphasis, and environmental uncertainty. Much past empirical research has 
examined various aspects of these variables. This study, however, has conducted the 
first known research on the moderating role of broadscope managerial accounting 
systems.
Although it did not support all the hypotheses, the study did indicate 
associations among broadscope accounting information, budgetary slack, budgetary 
emphasis, budgetary participation and perceived environmental uncertainty. Given the 
importance of budgeting, the findings of the current study should add to the growing
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
91
body o f empirical evidence regarding budgetary slack and the role of information in 
organizations.
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HELP! I must have at least 400 responses to the attached questionnaire to complete 
my doctoral dissertation at Louisiana Tech University. Please do me the favor of 
completing the attached questionnaire and returning it to me. If you have previously 
responded, thank you for your valuable assistance.
Your response is extremely important to the accuracy of my study, since I can only 
afford to send out a limited number o f questionnaires. I know this is an imposition, 
but it will only take approximately 15 minutes to complete the questionnaire. To 
make matters convenient, I have enclosed a postage paid return envelope.
You may recall that I am a doctoral student conducting a nationwide survey among 
persons with budgetary responsibilities. The purpose of my study is to develop a 
better understanding of why managers build slack in budgets.
Your responses will be held in the strictest confidence and will be grouped with others 
to guarantee your anonymity. There are no right or wrong responses to the items on 
the questionnaire.
Your help on this questionnaire is critical to my study. Without the data you provide,
I cannot finish my dissertation. If you would like to receive a copy of the aggregate 
results, please provide your name and address on a separate sheet of paper. Thank you 
in advance of your cooperation.
Sincerely yours,
Gary Linn
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SECTION 1
Please answer the following questions by filing in or checking the appropriate spaces 
(as it relates to you).
1. Current Job title:_____________________________________
2. Number of years in current position:_____________________
3. Your Organization’s Annual Gross Sales:_________________
4. Primary Industry in which your organization operates
(SIC code if  known):__________________________________






INSTRUCTIONS: Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the 
following statements.
7 = Strongly Agree 3 = Slightly Disagree
6 = Agree 2 = Disagree
5 = Slightly Agree 1 = Strongly Disagree
4 = Neither Agree nor Disagree
  7. I am involved in setting all portions of my budget.
  8. My budget is not final until I am satisfied with it.
  9. My opinion is an important factor in setting my budget.
  10. I am always clear about what is necessary to perform well on my job.
  11. I have adequate information to make optimal decisions to accomplish my
performance objectives.
  12. I am able to obtain the strategic information necessary to evaluate
important decision alternatives.
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SECTION 3
13. INSTRUCTIONS: Rate your performance as a manager on the following tasks 
using the following scale.
7 = Well Above average 
6 = Above Average 
5 = Slightly Above Average 
4 = Average
 Planning _____  Investigating
 Coordinating _____  Evaluating
 Supervising _____  Staffing
 Negotiating _____  Representing
  Rate your overall performance
SECTION 4
INSTRUCTIONS: For questions 14 - 42, indicate the extent that you use information 
with the characteristics specified in the following questions. Please use the following 
response scale and write the number corresponding to the level you use said 






14. Information which relates to possible future events (e.g., future 
government trade policies).
15. Information on the likelihood (quantified) of future events occurring (e.g., 
probability estimates).
16. Information of a non-economic nature such as customer preferences, 
employee attitudes, labor relations, attitudes o f government and consumer 
bodies, competitive threats.
17. Information on broad factors external to their organization such as 
economic conditions, population growth, technological developments.
3 = Slightly Below Average 
2 = Below Average 
1 = Well Below Average
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18. Information of a non-financial nature related to production activities such 
as output rates, scrap levels, machine efficiency, employee absenteeism.
19. Information related to product markets such as market size, growth in 
market share.
20. To protect himself, a manager submits a budget that can safely be attained.
21. The plant manager sets two levels o f standards: one between himself and 
production (sales) manager, and another standard between himself and top 
management, to be safe.
22. In good business times, the plant manager accepts a reasonable level o f 
slack in a departmental budget.
23. Slack in the budget is good to do things that cannot be officially approved.
24. How often do you feel that you have the information needed to understand 
the impact of your decision on this factor or vice versa?
25. How often do you believe that the information you have about this factor is 
adequate for decision making?
26. How difficult is it for you to get the necessary information about this factor 
for decision making?
27. How difficult is it to obtain additional information about this factor when 
you need it for decision making?
28. How often can you determine what ilic uuicome of a decision will be 
before it is made?
29. How often do you feel that you are unable to predict how this factor is 
going to react to, or be affected by, decisions made in the project or the 
Systems Command?
30. Is it frequently difficult to know whether this factor will react to, or be 
affected by, a decision before the decision has actually been made?
31. How often do you feel that you can consider alternative courses o f action 
before making a decision to follow a specific course o f action?
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  32. How often do you feel that you can effectively consider the consequences
of making decisions before they are made?
  33. How often do you feel that you are able to tell if the decisions you make
will have a positive or negative effect on your project’s overall 
performance?
  34. The plant manager has enough information to know if there is slack in a
departmental budget.
  35. Top management receives detailed information on the plant activities by
department and product.
  36. Top management has a way to know if there is slack in a departmental
budget.
  37. I pressure my subordinates to get things done for corporate benefits first.
  38. The budget in my department is set at a “tight” level to put on pressure for
increasing productivity and cost control.
  39. Top management judges the plant performance only on the basis of
attaining budget profits.
 40. Top management hates nothing more than a plant manager failing to meet
his budget.
  41. Top management believes in the merits o f exerting pressure on middle
management.
 42. If a plant manager fails in attaining his budget top management takes to
position that he should be replaced.
SECTION 5
INSTRUCTIONS: For question 43, please indicate the amount of time required.
 43. Which most nearly describes the typical length of time involved before you
can obtain feedback or information concerning the effects of your decision 
on the project? 1 day, 2 days, 1 week, 1 month, 6 months, 1 year, 2 
years +.
Thank you for taking the time to complete the survey. It will be a tremendous
help to me.
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Dear Manger:
I am a doctoral candidate conducting a nationwide survey of managers to gather data 
for my dissertation. The purpose of the study is to develop a better understanding of 
managers’ use of information and their creation of budgetary slack.
Your name was selected from a random sample of managers that have budgetary 
responsibilities. Your response is very important to the accuracy of my study. I 
understand that your time is valuable, but I would appreciate it if  you would take a few 
minutes to complete the short questionnaire. To help save time, I have enclosed a pre­
addressed postage-paid reply envelope.
Your completion of the questionnaire is critical to my study. Please complete and 
return the questionnaire as soon as possible. Your anonymity is guaranteed. Your 
responses cannot be identified according to individuals.
If you would like the results of the study, please enclose your business card when 
returning the survey, and I will send the results to you.
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